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Resumo
Este trabalho objetiva insvestigar a rela￿ªo entre lei, democracia e fatores socioecon￿micos com o
n￿vel de corrup￿ªo encontrado em estados brasileiros. O n￿vel de corrup￿ªo Ø mensurado pelo nœmero
de irregularidades encontradas em relat￿rios de auditoria federal. Os resultados emp￿ricos demonstram
que a eleva￿ªo do nœmero de transfŒncias federais provŒ para o agente pœblico maiores possibilidades de
exercer seu poder discricionÆrio e extrair rendas. AlØm disso, o aumento do nœmero mØdio de anos de
estudo para a popula￿ªo adulta no estado age como um deterrente da corrup￿ªo, pois a popula￿ªo torna-
se mais apta a monitorar os administradores pœblicos. Ademais, em estados com processo democrÆtico
em evolu￿ªo ou melhor estruturado, implica no menor n￿vel de corrup￿ªo.
Resumo
This paper aims at investigating the relation between the law, democracy and socioeconomic factors
with the level of corruption encountered in brazilian states. The corruption level is measured as the
number of irregularities found in federal audities reports. We found that as the amount of federal funds
transfered for a state rises, it provides for the public agent more room for exercise discricionary power
and for rent to be extracted. Also, if the average years of study for the adult population is increasing in
the state, it acts as a deterrant of corruption, because the population becomes more able of monitoring
the public administrators. Furthermore, in states where the democratic process is evolving or better
structured, it provides a lower level of corruption.
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11 Introduction
"Rouba, mas faz"1
In Brazil, the population is constantly surprised - or not so much anymore - by newspapers headlines
showing denounces of corruption in several agencies and hierarchies of the government. The most recents
ones are quoted below:
"Federal police arrests the Rio Grande do Norte’s governor son due to frauds in biddings" 2.
"The govern of the Rio Grande do Sul’s state is accused of involvement in the corruption of
state companies, the corruption money was used to ￿nance political campaign." 3
Not so long ago, other shocking corruption scheme published by the press was the Mensalªo. It involved
the deviation of money for private bene￿t or campaign ￿nancing by the brazilian’s Parlament. In 1992 the
brazilian’s president was accused of money deviation and surfered a process of impeachment. As can be
seen, corruption has been a characteristic of public money management in Brazil, becoming a serious and
enduring problem.
Corruption is a pervasive ilicit act, and it attaches strongly to the wheels of public system. It is not
only perpetrated by politians, but it is present in many degrees of the government hierarchy and should be
disencouraged to anyone to whom the possibity of gain appears. Because of this, research in this area have
been trying to better understand it and to propose policies and reforms for its erradication.
Prior studies have focused on several issues trying to understand the nature and impacts of corruption.
Treisman(2000) analysis the relation of corruption with historical and cultural traditions, levels of economic
development, political institutions, and government policies. Pellegrini and Gerlagh(2004) observes empiri-
cally the corruption’s e￿ect on growth through direct and indirect channels.
Lambsdor￿(1999) covers the question in a broder way analysing its impacts on investment, GDP, institu-
tional quality, government expenditure, poverty and international ￿ows of capital, goods and aid. Serra(2004)
develops a sensitivity analyse, ￿nding that corruption is lower in richer countries, and the ones with longer
democratic institutions and where the population’s mainly religion is Protestantism, and on the other hand,
it is higher in countries with political instability.
Goel and Nelson(1998) observes the e￿ect of goverment size on corruption originated from two sources:
the individual’s incentives to act corruptily(demand driven) and for the incentives existent at the larger
1It is a famous brazilian saying in relation to corrupt politians. A rough translation would be: steals, but yet does something.
2Author’s responsable for the Headlight’s translation. Newspaper: Folha de Sªo Paulo, 13/06/2008
3Author’s responsable for the translation. Newspaper: Folha de Sªo Paulo, 11/06/2008, article: Yeda ataca vice-governador
e critica repercussªo de esc￿ndalo no RS.
2government spending(suppy driven). Freille, Haque and Kneller studied the relationship between aggregate
press freedom and corruption.
All of this studies, however, adress the matter at a country level. This paper aims to adress it in a
lower level: the country’s states. The data base used is drawn from the audit reports of the federal internal
audit agency (Corregedoria Geral da Uniªo - CGU). This data is not based on subjective assessements of
corruption, it covers the type and number of irregularities found in every state in relation to federal money
transfers two years prior to the audit. The authors consider it a consistent measure of corruption, because
each irregularity reported constitutes a breach on a speci￿c legal norm.
With the objective of providing support to policies and reform, this study tries to understand the relation
between the judicial and political institutions and socioeconomic factors with the occurrence of corruption.
Following Brown and Shackman(2007), we propose the following factors: law and order, democracy, economic
level and education to be studied, as its represented by the organogram below
What is meant by each category is explained in section 2. The description of the variables and how they
were built is detailed in section 3, related to the Data. Section 4 describes the model. Finally, section 5
report and explain the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Corruption: de￿nition and causes
"Corruption is a moral category that signi￿es putre￿cation and rot."(Rose-Ackerman), meaning that corrup-
tion is an immoral act as it violates the principles of behavior. More speci￿cally, corruption allows unvirtuous
behavior to take place and stablishes itself.
The type of corruption focused here is the one perpetrated by government agents from any agency or
hierarchy, and it is de￿ned as the misuse of public power for private bene￿t. Misuse of public power represents
any act that contravenes an existent explicit law, norm or regulation. And private bene￿t is understood as
an action where a rational agent makes a choice taking in account only his gains liquid from his evaluated
losses, which means that he doesn’t consider its impacts on others.
By restricting the corrupt act to those where occurs personal gain, the acts considered as ilicit are the
3ones in which the incorrect follow of the norms, leaves room for rent to be extrated. For example, an o￿cial
document missing a stamp or a signature could reveal that it was naivily forgotten, or that, actually, was
purpously forgotten in other for a bribe to be demanded or for government money to be deviated.
It suggests that there are three conditions necessary for corruption to arise(Aidt, 2003):
1. Discretionary power - the public agent must possess authority to act in a discretionary manner;
2. Economic rents - there is possibility of rent extraction;
3. Weak institutions - the structure of the legal, political and administrative institutions is such that
creates incentives for public agents to extract rents.
Given this conditions, this paper aims to explore the condition of weak institutions related to the legal
and political aspects and the state’s socioeconomic factors.
2.1 Corruption and the Law
The legal institutions are a set of public agencies that assure the application and obedience to the law in the
society throgh the de￿nition of the degree of penalty and punishments associated to each break of the law.
Its quality acts as a deterrent to crimes, and, also, a deterrent to corrution. Expectations about the law in
preventing and punishing crimes(Becker,1965) a￿ects the perception of public agents of the probability of
being caught and penalized.
Having an independent legal system is an essential factor in reducing corruption as recent literature as-
serts. The existence of strong negative correlation between law and corruption(Herfeld and Weiss(2003)) and
a lower perception of the law in the society is associated to a higher level of corruption(Cartier-Breeson,2000).
And, as Brown and Shackman(2007) shows, there is a direct causality from law and order to corruption,
with the law and order factor reducing corruption in the short- and long-run.
The brazilian legal system, according to the Constitution, is independent, as are its components, and
is divided in four main agencies: the Courts of law; the Prosecutor’s O￿ce; the Public Advocacy and the
National Order of Lawyers (OAB). The crimes are investigated and prosecuted by the State Prosecutor’s
O￿ce, when it refers to state’s or municipality’s jurisdiction, and by the Federal Prosecutor’s O￿ce, when
it is federal jurisdiction. Within this crimes are included the misuse of public agente position for private
bene￿t.
In this context, where there is a small number of prosecutors, it would be less probable of an investigation
to be started in a speci￿c government agency without prior denouncement has been placed, which leads to
a low probability of an irregularity to be discovered and of a court process to be open. So, it was considered
that the number of prosecutor’s in a state was a relevant proxy to measure the degree of the law and order.
4Although an unusual variable, the homicide rate was the other selected variable, because it may re￿ect
the social perception of the perfomance and existence of the law. In a society where the rate of violent crimes
is very high, it would be considered that the law is lax, and so, how could it prevent corruption or other
kinds of crimes?
2.2 Corruption and Democracy
A democratic government regime is the one where the power to take important political decisions is in the
hands of the citizens, directly or indirectly, by the elected representatives. Moreover, it guarantees that
the government acts accordingly to the rule of law and assures that every citizen receives the same legal
protection. Democracy also relates to the degree of political freedom, as it provides liberty to the citizens.
More democracy, then, enhance the existence of opposing political parties and the decision to vote.
Some recent studies corraborate this. Treisman(2000), for example, reports that a long exposure to
democracy reduces corruption, though a current degree of democracy is not signi￿cant to reduce corruption.
Brown and Shackman(2007) reports that the democratic variable reduces corruption in the short- and long-
run; while Chowdhury(2004) founds that a democracy index has a signi￿cant impact on corruption and that
the voter’s participation is the more robust within its components.
Then, it is expected that for higher levels of democracy, there should be less corruption. The democratic
process, through elections, enforces the permanence of politians that protect society’s rights and avoid misuse
of power, and withdraws from power the corrupt politicians.
In Brazil, the democratic process is di￿cult to be fully grasped. First, vote is a compulsory act, not an
individual choice to exercise its democratic power, so, the number of citizens voting in the elections might
not represent the people’s decision to exercise the democratic act. Second, it might be one of the countries
with the most higher number of active political parties. The actual number is 27 4, making it di￿cult for the
citizens to select the right candidate. Fortunately, the rules applied in the brazilian electoral process in every
state is rather the same, avoiding the possibility of the state’s democratic level to be due to its legislation.
A country can be de￿ned to be less democratic if the minority parties have little in￿uence on politics,
which is de￿ned as a measure of democracy by Gastil(Barro,1999). Based on this and on vote being an
democratic act, it is thought that the Vanhanen democratization index 5 would represent a good measure of
democracy.
4http://www.tse.gov.br/internet/partidos/index.htm
5Explained in the Data section.
52.3 Corruption and Socioeconomic factors
The social characteristics of a society determines its level of developement, not only in economic terms
but also the population access to education, health and quality of life. However, as some studies point
out, the degree of some characteristics might facilitate for corruption to occur. For exemple, Serra(2004)
and Treisman(2000) both found, throght empirical data, that richer countries tend to have less corruption
then poorest ones. Albuquerque e Ramos(2006) asserts that richer and well-educated population are better
capable of monitoring the public administrators and are associated to fewer corruption. In another direction,
You and Khagram(2006) argues that income inequality increases the level of corruption.
Based on this foundings, the socioeconomic factors focused on are the economic level and the level of
education. To represent the economic level it was chosen the state’s PIB, which is a variable that re￿ects
the level of investment and productivity in the economy, both of which may be a￿ected by corruption. The
education level considered important for this study aim was the average number of schooling years for people
over 25 years old. It is a measure of the education of the adult population in the state, which is the segment
that makes the society’s decisions.
3 Model
This section is subdivided in two parts: the model estimated according to the dependent variable and the
description of the data along with its source.
3.1 Estimation Model
The dependent variable, irregularities, only assumes positive integer values and is not limited by an upper
bound, suggesting that it assembles to count data. By this means, the regression analyses is performed by
a model for count data. The test of Cameron and Trivedi 6 and the test of Wooldridge7 both indicates that
there is the presence of overdispersion in the data, so the model adopted will be the Negative Binomial
Model.
The Poisson regression model is the simplest model for count data. Its distribution is given by
yijxi,ci Poisson[cim(xi;)] ci > 0
(1)
6Cameron and Trivedi propose a regression based test of the Poisson restriction. The test is based on an auxiliary regres-
sion(OLS) of e2
i - yi on ^ y2
i and testing the signi￿cance of the regression coe￿cient. If the t-statistic is found insigni￿cant, it
indicates that the poisson model can be correctly applied.
7Wooldridge’s alternative approach is to regress e2
i - 1 on hatyi, where the errors are standardized, but the method of analyse
is basicly the same.
6It is assumed that ci follows a gama distribution with unit mean and V ar(ci) = 2. So, the expected




Var(ci) = m(xi;) + 2m(xi;)
(3)
where we adopted the exponential function
m(xi;) = exp(xi;)
(4)
This way, the model to be estimated is:
irregi = exp(0 + 1recuri + Xi)i = 1;:::;N (5)
where irreg is the number of irregularities, Xi the variable vector to be tested e  his respective coe￿cient
vector.
The estimation method used was the Maximum Likelihood(ML). The Quase-Maximum Likelihood(QML)
was also applied, but both presented the very similar, so ML estimator was preferred because of its properties.
It is consistent, e￿cient and asymptotically normally distributed.
3.2 Data Description
The variable of corruption is the number of irregularities found in federal audities reports related to the
application of federal government money transfers in the states. This data is from a data base compiled by
Francisco Ramos’ research team, and is based on the audit reports stemming from a surveillance police called
random audit program and carried out by CGU. This program randomly selects Brazilian municipalities and
states for audits to take place in order to analyse the occurence of federal money transfers misuse. Its reports
are available on the internet 8.
The audit is conducted over the money transfers occured in the last two years by an independent comission
of auditors from the CGU, which reduces the chances of it to be corrupted. The irregularities found range
from a simples infraction, as the absence of a legal documentation, to a large deviation of public funds.
The similar aspect between them is they contravenes a law or public regulation. Examples of the type of
irregularities found are given in Appendix A.
8http://www.cgu.gov.br
7It was considered that some irregularities might only be due to a lax administration not to the occurence
of corruption. However, within the data set it is also discriminated the explanation provided by the public
administrator for the encountered irregularities. And less than 5% of these explanations were found to be
binding by the auditors.
Until now, the data base has information about 23 of the brazilian’s 27 states 9, including the Federal
district. The four states not yet audited were AmapÆ, Piau￿, Rio Grande do Sul and Sergipe. As the audits
consider only the transfered money funds from two years prior to the audit, the irregulatities considered are
committed between the years of 2002 and 2005.
Another variable originated from the random audit program was the total funds related to the irregular-
ities. Its inclusion in the regression is due to this probable relation to corruption. It is expected that for a
larger money transfer the ilicit acts should be higher than for inexpressive ones, because there is more rent
to be extracted.
The democratic measure applied was the Vanhanen’s democratization index. It is based in two dimen-
sions: public contestation and the right to participate, which is named as competition and participation,
respectively(Chowdhury,2004). Competition refers to the electoral success of the smaller parties 10 and is
calculated by their porcentage of the total votes realized during election. Participation, on the other hand,
refers to the percentage of the total state’s population that actually voted in the elections. The data used to
compile the index was obtained from the Superior Electoral Court in relation to the 2006 Governor elections.
The legal measure considered was the number of prosecutors per 100.000 inhabitants. It can be found
in the 2006 Prosecutor’s O￿ce report 11, and is calculated for all 26 states, but not for the Federal District.
In order not to lose an observation, the Federal District value was determined as the medium number of
prosecutors for the Center-West region, where the Federal district is located.
The other variables included in the model were gross domestic product(PIB), Homicide rate(2002 12) and
Average number of schooling years for people over 25 years old(2005). They are from, respectivaly, the
IBGE’s States Data Base for the ￿rst, and the government’s research institute Ipea 13 for the last ones.
The statistics summary of the variables can be observed in the table below.
9It is based only until the 4th draw of the states reports.
10The parties were classi￿ed in major and minor according to this political weight. Major parties are: PMDB, PTB, PDT,
PT, PSB and PSDB. And the minor parties are: DEM, PCdoB, PTC, PMN, PRP, PV, PTdoB, PSTU, PCB, PRTB, PHS,
PSDC, PCO, PTN, PRB, PSOL, PR, PSL, PSC, PPS, PP. In the case a coalition political, the presence of one of the major
parties classi￿es it as a major party.
11It can be found at http://www.mp.gov.br
12This represents the year in which the research was conducted.
13http://www.ipeadata.gov.br
8Tabela 1: Variable Statistic Summary
Variable Mean Min Max St. Deviation
Irregulaties 112.55 22 337 82.34
Total funds(108) 1.78 0.044 6.57 1.887
Prosecutor 4.762 3.11 7.44 1.14
Homicid rate 27.32 9.925 56.74 14.61
Democratic Index 32.29 26.65 50.20 5.02
lnPIB 17.42 14.97 20.40 1.283
Average School 5.976 4.227 7.727 0.947
4 Results
Firstly, a remark should be made, most of the relevant variables had a certain degree of correlation between
them. Many other variables also considered for the analysis were droped for this reason. Some of them were
the gini index, the idh index, literacy rate, per capita income.
Due to this, it was considered better to analyse the independent variables per related groups. The group
of independent variables are: the political and legal factors group and the socioeconomic factor grooup. The
￿rst regression performed considered only the total funds deviated, as a way of checking its signi￿cance with
corruption.
The tests for overdispersion were also performed for the disagregated regressions. Its result showed the
presence of overdispersion for all of them, so the same regression model was applied to the other regressions:
the Negative Binoial regression. The table below describes the four models performed and their respective
results.
As the value of the LR test for every equation is signi￿cant and Pseudo- R2 arround 0.80, the four of
them are considered well-speci￿ed and adjusted. It can also be seen that most of the variables are highly
insigni￿cant. The insigni￿cance might be due to one of this main factors: lack of relation between the
variables; autocorralation between the variables or sample size. However, as this factors are related, it is
di￿cult to distinguish one from the other.
In regression (1), the only variable was total funds and it has a positive and signi￿cative relation to
corruption. It means that, ceteris paribus, for larger amounts of federal transfers to states, it is expected
a higher number of irregularities. So, at a unit increase in the standard deviation of the total funds,
approximately 178 million reais, would increase irregularities in 40%.
The second regression analyse the political and legal factors and, again, the total funds. The nule
hyphotesis concerning the legal factor, represented by number of prosecutors and the homicide rate, was
rejected as both variables were found insigni￿cant. Although, it is interesting to point out the direction of
9Tabela 2: Poisson Regression over Irreg
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total funds(108) 0.223170 0.275590 0.181774 0.206151
(2.77)*** (2.784318)*** (2.689044)*** (2.193817)**
Prosecutor 0.022927 -0.179659
(0.179833) (-1.086748)
Homicid rate 0.005620 0.008748
(0.534184) (0.887554)




Average School -0.263778 -0.180669
(-2.352746)** (-1.033983)
Intercept 4.247224 5.822884 6.918895 9.425450
(22.98)*** (6.478729)*** (5.206125)*** (3.875284)***
Pseudo(R2) 0.812703 0.811826 0.819448 0.816179
Log likelihood -124.0171 -117.1970 -119.5508 -114.4860
LR test 1076.249 1011.232 1085.181 1016.654
Probability(LRtest) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 23 22 23 22
Obs. The value below the coe￿cients of the variables is the z-Statistic, where * is signi￿cant at 10%, ** at
5% and *** at 1%.
relation between them and the level of corruption. In relation to the prosecutors the direction of causality
should be accounted for, the sign might represent that a higher level os corruption in a state demands more
prosecutors. The explanation to the homicide rate steams from the fact that states’ with high rates of violent
crimes are due to ine￿ective law or to a lenient treatment to corruption, because crimes against others are
prioritized. Again, total funds variable was found signi￿cant and consistent.
A interesting fact was the sign and signi￿cance of the democratic index. The level of democracy in
a society is, as found in prior studies, relevant to reduce the level of corruption. This provides empirical
consideration that the electoral process might be able to remove corrupt or inne￿enct public agents from
o￿ce. Actually, if democracy is enhanced in a state, it reduces corruption in 30% for a 5 point increase in
the index, keeping the other variables constant.
The regression (3) was related to the socioeconomic factors, the PIB and the average schooling. As
expected, the total funds was again signi￿cant. The surprising fact was that the PIB was found insigni￿cant
10and his sign positive, while it was expected that the richer the state, the lower level of corruption is, as is
predicted by Albuquerque e Ramos(2006). Infering only in the signal, given the type of corruption measure
used, it is possible that a richer state is associated with more transfer of funds 14 and with more government
projects, which increases the chances of corruption to occur.
Considering the relevance of the average schooling and its signs, it means that the increase in the years of
education of the adult population acts as a deterrant to corruption in approximately 25%, for other variables
held constant. Leading to the acceptance of the nule hyphotese that education reduces corruption, as was
found also in Albuquerque e Ramos(2006). They suggest that the higher the education the lower is the
assymety of information between the population and the public agents.
The last regression, which considered all the variables, had only the total funds as signi￿cant. Though,
the other variables were highly insigni￿cant when grouped together, their signs were the ones expected by
the nule hyphotesis: more prosecutors, enhanced democracy, richer and more educated state would reduce
corruption, while the level of homicide and total funds would increase it.
5 Conclusion
This paper aimed to analyse if weak institutions, as proposed by Aidt(2003), was a relevant condition in the
brazilian state’s level of corruption. Using the information cointaned in CGU’s audit reports as a measure of
corruption, the focus was on the relation between corruption and state’s legal, political and socioeconomic
factors. Our empirical results founds, however, do not corroborate all of the assumptions made.
The model predicts accurately the essence of irregularities variation. As the amount of federal funds
transfered for a state rises, it provides for the public agent more room for exercise discricionary power and
for rent to be extracted. Morever, if the average years of study for the adult population are increasing in
the state, it acts as a deterrant of corruption as the population becames more able of monitoring the public
administrators. Furthermore, in states where the democratic process is evolving or better structured, it
provides a higher level of democracy in relation to others. So, a higher competition between the parties,
with the minor ones having a more expressive results in elections, and a increasing population participation
in the elections, with the people exercising its freedom of choice, re￿ects on a lower level of corruption and
on the removal of corrupt or inne￿enct public agents from government agencies.
This ￿ndings indicate the main channels in which policies and reforms should be focused to reduce the
public agents possibility and incentive to act corruptly. As seen, this policies is not restricted to short-run
actions. For the level of education and democracy to be enhanced and e￿ective against corruption, it is
necessary a continue improvement in this areas. This work leaves as suggestion the analyse of the in￿uence
of the state’s historical process and culture in its degree of democracy. It might be a cause of the di￿erence
14A possible explanation for the PIB insigni￿cance is the correlation between it and funds.
11in degree found.
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7 Appendix A
Here, there is a small sample on four groups of irregularity as an example of the data used. It is based on
Zamboni e Litschig(2007).
Procurement
Irregularities in this category relate mostly to limited competition for contracts and attempts to obstruct
oversight by both auditors and stakeholders in the procurement process. The following are examples of
the types of irregularities included in this category: missing/incomplete procurement documentation, ir-
regular composition/capture of the procurement commission, inadequate/incomplete publication of tender
information and participating ineligible.
Program/project execution
This category includes irregularities related to the execution of new programs and capital projects.
Irregularities include the following: diversion of project resources, substandard project execution, lacking
oversight of project implementation, irregular project documentation.
Financial reporting
This category includes irregularities related to the quality and timeliness of ￿nancial reporting by local
governments. Public o￿cials involved in committing irregularities are for the most part ￿nancial managers.
Irregularities include: irregular/non-existent ￿nancial report, irregular/non-existent receipts.
Civil society oversight
Irregularities in this category are related to civil society oversight. Examples are: non-existent civil
society council, ine￿cient/non-existent oversight, irregular council composition.
13